Covers the shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force.

As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Britain's strategic legacy

Atomic decisions and threat assessment

British origins of nuclear deterrence 1945-6

The doctrine of damage limitation 1946-9

Operational planning and Anglo-American strategic co-ordination 1945-50

Korea and Anglo-American nuclear strategy 1950-2

The global strategy paper and the United States 'New Look'

Mass destruction, nuclear war-fighting and delivery systems 1953-5

The hydrogen bomb and deterrence in
concert 1954-5

Conclusion