This volume highlights the complex intra-alliance politics of what was seen as the likeliest flash point of conflict in the Cold War and demonstrates how strongly determinant were concerns about relationships with allies in the choices made by all the major governments.

This volume highlights the complex intra-alliance politics of what was seen as the likeliest flash point of conflict in the Cold War and demonstrates how strongly determinant were concerns about relationships with allies in the choices made by all the major governments. It recounts the evolution of policy during the 1958 and 1961 Berlin crises from the perspective of each government central to the crisis, one on the margins and the military headquarters responsible for crafting an agreed Western military campaign.

Berlin and the Cold War, L. Freedman
background to the 1958-62 Berlin crisis, J.P.S. Gearson
a broader range of choice? US policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin crisis, K. Schake
Britain and the Berlin Wall crisis 1959-1962, J.P.S. Gearson
De Gaulle, the bomb and Berlin - how to use a political weapon, C. Buffet
the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall crisis, H. Harrison
the Berlin crisis and the FRG, 1958-1962, J. Kastner
Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961, L. Nuti, B. Bagnato
three hats for Berlin - general Lauris Norstad and the second Berlin Crisis 1958-62, G. Pedlow
Berlin crisis timeline.