Market societies have created more wealth, and more opportunities for more people, than any other system of social organization in history. Addressing the unruly dynamism that capitalism brings with it, this work argues that the basic drift of any one market and its actors, even allowing for competition, is toward stabilization.

He makes new inroads into the "theory of fields," which links the formation of markets and firms to the problems of stability. His political-cultural approach explains why governments remain crucial to markets and why so many national variations of capitalism endure. States help make stable markets possible by, for example, establishing the rule of law and adjudicating the class struggle.State-building and market-building go hand in hand. Fligstein shows that market actors depend mightily upon governments and the members of society for the social conditions that produce wealth. He demonstrates that systems favoring more social justice and redistribution can yield stable markets and economic growth as readily as less egalitarian systems. This book will surely join the classics on capitalism. Economists, sociologists, policymakers, and all those interested in what makes markets function as they do will read it for many years to come.

List of Tables xi
Preface xiii
1. Bringing Sociology Back In 3
A Critique of the E isting Literature in the Sociology of Markets 6
Theoretical Questions for a Sociology of Markets 10
A Political-Cultural Approach 15
Structure of the Book 20
Nor ative Implications of the Political-Cultural Approach to the Sociology of Markets 21
PART I 25
2. Markets as Institutions 27
Market Institutions: Basic Definitions 28
State Building and Market Building 36
Power in Policy Domains and Market Institutions 42
3. The Politics of the Creation of Market Institutions 45
Political Structuring of Labor Market Institutions 53
Policy Domains and Market Regulation in Real Societies 56
Stability and Complexity 59
Implications for Research 62
Conclusion 64
4. The Theory of Fields and the Problem of Market Formation 67
Markets as Fields 67
The Goal of Action in Stable Markets 70
The Proble of Change and Stability in Markets 75
Links between Market For ation and States 86
Some Macro Implications of the Theory of Fields 89
Globalization and Market Processes 94
Conclusion 97
PART II 99
5. The Logic of Employment Systems 101
Employment Systems as Institutional Projects 103
Variations and Transfor ations in Employment Systems 107
The Dynamics of Systems of Employment Relations 108
Insights into Comparative Employment Systems 111
Research Agendas 117
Conclusion 120
6. The Dynamics of U.S. Firms and the Issue of Ownership and Control in the 1970s 123
Review of the Literature 124
Manage ent versus Owner Control 125
Bank Control 126
Market Dynamics and Manage ent Control 128
Hypotheses 130
Data and Methods 132
Results 136
Discussion and Conclusions 144
Appendix A 146
7. The Rise of the Shareholder Value Conception of the Firm and the Merger Movement in the 1980s 147
What Is to Be Explained? 150
Finance Economics 151
Manager, Owner, and Bank Control 153
The Crisis of the Finance Conception of Control and the Rise of the Shareholder Value Conception of Control 155
Hypotheses 157
Data and Methods 158
Results 162
Conclusion 166
8. Corporate Control in Capitalist Societies 170
Economic Theories and Mechanisms 172
Sociological Theories of Control 176
Comparative Cases 181
Conclusion 189
9. Globalization 191
Definitions of Globalization 193
Critique of Globalization Arguments 195
The Slow Expansion and Unevenness of Global Trade 196
Change or Continuity in the Organization of Production? 203
Does Globalization Cause Deindustrialization and Inequality? 206
Politics, Govern ents, and Financial Markets 209
Trade, Competition, Industrial Policy, and the Welfare State 213
Globalization and Neoliberalis as an American Project 220
Conclusion 221
0. Conclusions 223
Two Tales of One Industry 223
Stability and Efficiency 228
Efficiency, Stability, and Equity 231
Conclusion 236
Notes 239
Bibliography 247
Index 269