Ruling Passions
A Theory of Practical Reasoning

The author posits a philosophy of human motivation and morality in which he maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. He seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame and other moral emotions, and draws on game theory and cognitive science

Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws also on game theory and cognitive science in his account of the structures of human motivation. Many philosophers have wanted a naturalistic ethics a theory that integrates our understanding of human morality with the rest of our understanding of the world we live in. What is special about Blackburn's naturalistic ethics is that it does not debunk the ethical by reducing it to the non-ethical. At the same time he banishes the spectres of scepticism and relativism that have haunted recent moral philosophy. Ruling Passions sets ethics in the context of human nature: it offers a solution to the puzzle of how ethics can maintain its authority even though it is rooted in the very emotions and motivations that it exists to control.

Introduction
1. Organizing Practice: The Elements of Ethics
2. Things That Concern Us
3. The Ethical Proposition: What It Is Not
4. Naturalizing Norms
5. Looking Out For Yourself
6. Game Theory and Rational Actors
7. The Good, the Right, and the Common Point of View
8. Self-Control, Reason, and Freedom
9. Relativism, Subjectivism, Knowledge
Appendix
Bibliography
Index