The essays collected together in this volume explore the commonsensical fact that our presence as reasonable agents makes a causal difference to the course of events in the world.

The essays collected together in this volume explore the commonsensical fact that our presence as reasonable agents makes a causal difference to the course of events in the world. It is generally acknowledged that two distinct processes are involved in human action: deliberation and causation - processes that should be described in very different ways. Although each contributor to this volume will think differently about how to conceive of the relation between these processes, all agree that progress in the philosophy of mind and action will depend upon a better understanding of the relation between deliberation and causation. This collection should be of interest to professionals and graduate students working in the philosophy of mind and action as well as in related disciplines such as metaphysics, philosophy of psychology and moral psychology.

Part I Deliberation: the possibility of philosophy of action, M. Smith
the real reasons, F. Stoutland
reasons and the first person, Jaegwon Kim
freedom in belief and desire, P. Pettit, M. Smith
goodwill, determinism and justification, M. Sie
making X happen - prolepsis and the problem of mental determination, J. Bransen. Part II Causation: minds, machines, and money - what really explains behaviour, F. Dretske
what can the semantic properties of innate representations explain? P. Jacob
the efficacy of content - a functionalist theory, T. Crane
two claims that can save a nonreductive account of mental causation, M. Slors
what we do - a nonreductive approach to human action, L. Rudder Baker
robust activity, event-causation, and agent-causation, S.E. Cuypers.