Discusses event-based pollution problems, suggesting that in such cases environmental policy instruments can take either the "ex-ante" policy forms such as taxation, or "ex-post" policy instruments - compensation, for example. Environmental liabilty falls under the latter description.

While liability rules can be designed to reduce these disincentive effects, it is likely that the joint use of liability and safety regulation will lead to mor eeffective reduction of environmental risks than the use of liability alone.

Part 1 Theory: the role of liability - property rules, liability rules and alienability - one view of the cathedral, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, liability for harm versus regulation of safety, Steven Shavell, a comparison of taxes, regulation and liability rules under imperfect information, Michele J. White, a model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Steven Shavell
incentive effects of liability - strict liability vs. negligence, Steven Shavell, strict liability vs. negligence in a market setting, A. Mitchell Polinsky, when does the rule of liability matter?, Harold Demsetz, strict liability in a principal-agent model, Harry A. Newman and David W. Wright, on liability and insurance, Steven Shavell, the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and negligence, Keith N. Hylton, bankruptcy and care choice, T.R. Beard, tort law as a regulatory regime for catastrophic personal injuries, William Landes and Richard Posner. Part 2 Applications: conceptual models - the effects of environmental liability on industrial real estate development, James Boyd et al, lender penalty for environmental damage and the equilibrium cost of capital, Anthony Heyes, sharing damages among multiple tortfeasors, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Pevesz, indivisible toxic torts - the economics of joint and several liability, Tom H. Tietenberg, liability for groundwater contamination from pesticides, Kathleen Segerson, the structure of penalties in environmental enforcement - an economic analysis, Kathleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg
empirical models -controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules -some evidence from OCS leasing, James J. Opaluch and Thomas A. Grigalunas, premiums for environmental liability - does superfund increase the cost of capital?, Steven Garber and James K. Hammitt, strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management -empirical evidence from accident and spill data, Anna Alberini and David Austin, liability and large-scale, long-term hazards, A.H. Ringleb and Steven N. Wiggins
liability reform - environmental liability reform and privatization in central and eastern Europe, James Boyd, economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents - some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, Michael Faure.