Institutional change within the US Congress has been a product of, and a shaper of, congressional politics. Academics have explained this in terms of a collective interest shared by members. This work makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines change.

He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation - and thus of American political development and history.

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Chapter 1. Disjointed Pluralism and Institutional Change 3
Chapter 2. Institutional Development, 1890-1910: An Experiment in Party Government 27
Chapter 3. Institutional Development, 1919-1932: Cross-Party Coalitions, Bloc Government, and Republican Rule 85
Chapter 4. Institutional Development, 1937-1952: The Conservative Coalition, Congress against the Executive, and Committee Government 136
Chapter 5. Institutional Development, 1970-1989: A Return to Party Government or the Triumph of Individualism? 189
Chapter 6. Understanding Congressional Change 249
Epilogue. Institutional Change in the 1990s 270
Appendix A. Case Selection 277
Appendix B. Votes Pertaining to Institutional Changes in
Each Period 281
Notes 295
References 329
Index 349