Applied Industrial Economics

A reader in applied industrial organisation for graduate and senior undergraduate level students edited by the leading writer in this field.

This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area.

Preface
Introduction
Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton
2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee
3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat
4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff
5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - 'shakeout' or 'stakeout'? Marvin B. Lieberman
Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann
7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-Francois Thisse and Xavier Vives
8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman
9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz
10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven
11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade
12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees
Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips
14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay
15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD
16. Joint R&
D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&
D in duopoly with spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin
Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds
18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro
19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden
20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro
21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger
22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney
23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright
Index.