In this volume, Larry May locates a normative grounding for the crime of aggression.

In this volume, the third in his trilogy on the philosophical and legal aspects of war and conflict, Larry May locates a normative grounding for the crime of aggression - the only one of the three crimes charged at Nuremberg that is not currently being prosecuted - that is similar to that for crimes against humanity and war crimes. He considers cases from the Nuremberg trials, philosophical debates in the Just War tradition, and more recent debates about the International Criminal Court, as well as the hard cases of humanitarian intervention and terrorist aggression. His thesis refutes the traditional understanding of aggression. At Nuremberg, crimes against humanity charges were only pursued if the defendant also engaged in the crime of aggression. May argues for a reversal of this position, contending that aggression charges should be pursued only if the defendant's acts involve serious human rights violations.

Part I. Pacifism and Just Wars: 1. Introduction: between the horrors and the necessity of war
2. Grotius and contingent pacifism
3. International solidarity and the duty to aid
Part II. Rethinking the Normative Ad Bellum Principles: 4. The principle of priority of first strike
5. The principle of just cause
6. The principle of proportionality
Part III. The Precedent of Nuremberg: 7. Custom and the Nuremberg precedent
8. Prosecuting military and political leaders
9. Prosecuting civilians for complicity
Part IV. Conceptualizing the Crime of Aggression: 10. Defining state aggression
11. Act and circumstances in the crime of aggression
12. Individual mens rea and collective liability
Part V. Hard Cases and Concluding Thoughts: 13. Humanitarian interventions
14. Terrorist aggression
15. Defending international criminal trials for aggression.