There has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny.

Philosophers and psychologists join forces to investigate a set of problems to do with agency and self-awareness, in 17 essays, presented in this book. There has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny.

1. Introduction
2. The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action
3. Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge
4. Conscious Awareness of Intention and of Action
5. Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach
6. The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation
7. Experimental Approaches to Action
8. Perception and Agency
9. Fractionating and the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Analysis
10. Dual Control and the Causal Theory of Action: The Case of Non-intentional Action
11. The Development of Young Children's Action Control and Awareness
12. Children's Action Control and Awareness: Comment on Frye and Zelazo
13. The Development of Self-Consciousness
14. Perceiving Intentions
15. The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy between Sensation and Action
16. The Epistemology of Physical Action
17. On Knowing One's Own Actions
18. Intentional Action and Self-Awareness
Index