What makes an event count as an action? Perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states, but not when caused in other ways. This book argues that this type of answer is methodologically and substantially mistaken. It offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action.

What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.

Acknowledgements.- Preface.- Two Questions. Appendix I: The Status Question: What to Look for?- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism.- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case against Ascriptivism. Appendix II: An Alternative Reading of Hart.- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility.- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility.- Foundationalism and the Production Question.- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism. Appendix III: Reflections on the Pursuit of a Causal Analysis of Action.- Nouveau Volitionism.- Weak Productionism.- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action.- Bibliography.- Index.